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Abstract
We analyze the consequences of consumers’ behavior concerning personal arbitrage in a spatial
discrimination context where firms know consumers distribution but cannot distinguish them by
location. The firms’  equilibrium pricing policies provide incentives  for consumers not to
demand their preferred varieties of products but rather to purchase more standard varieties. This
behavior may explain a decrease in observed market diversity: the demanded varieties tend to
agglomerate around the center of the market. We also deal with efficiency in the presence of
personal arbitrage and show that it is efficient for  the  cost of adapting the  product to the
consumers needs to be shared through arbitrage, but oligopoly gives rise to an inefficient level of
personal arbitrage.
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1. Introduction
In some markets, we observe that products are standardized: only one type of product is sold
even though consumers’ preferences may differ as to the best variety. In other markets, several
varieties are produced but not as many as to satisfy the preferences of all consumers, so that
some of them end up buying products that are close to, but not exactly, their preferred varieties.
Examples include the acquisition of software: many of us do not buy an application that is the
best suited to our needs, rather, we have to settle for something that is close enough; note that it
would be possible for a consumer to order a custom-made application, but in most cases this is
not done because it would be too expensive. Another example is transport: we do not find a bus
stop at every doorstep; people walk a few minutes to the nearest one.
1 We account for these
phenomena on the basis of personal arbitrage.
2 We show that in equilibrium, consumers and
firms share the costs of adapting the product to the consumers’ needs, and the part of the cost
paid by consumers may be in terms of utility loss. We also show that it is efficient for cost to be
shared through arbitrage, but oligopoly gives rise to an inefficient level of personal arbitrage.
A common feature of most papers on spatial price discrimination is that consumers’ locations
are assumed to be known and firms take the product to those locations. However, some authors
have addressed the problem faced by firms when demand is not known. Stole (1995), Hamilton
and Thisse (1997) and Pires and Sarkar (2000) consider second degree price discrimination
through  the  use of nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly setting where  firms  are spatially
differentiated. In these papers the optimal pricing policies are obtained under the assumption that
firms may commit themselves to a pricing strategy  before  consumers  make their purchase
decision, and this assumption may be appropriate in many circumstances (firms might commit
themselves to prices through announcements in newspapers,  catalogs,  etc.).  Nevertheless,
changing pricing policies is not very costly and therefore commitment may be weak. This would
                                    
1 Rhee et al. (1992) study standardization in the presence of attributes that are unobservable by firms.
2 This type of arbitrage is associated with the transferability of demand between different packages or bundles
(for example, price-location packages) offered to consumers. See, for example, Tirole (1988).-3-
be the case for some products with so many varieties that the price list is not publicly available.
Rather, the consumer asks for a price quote specifying the required product characteristics (for
example, a piece of furniture made to order). In this paper, we deal with the problem of firms’
pricing under unknown locations when there is no commitment to pricing policies. In practice,
this absence of commitment implies that firms’ policies should be best responses to consumers’
behavior and viceversa. In this context consumers are given an active role
3 and personal arbitrage
appears under a new light, although some arbitrage would also be present with firms’
commitment to the pricing schedules.
When transportation costs are quadratic (see, for example, d’Aspremont et al., 1979)
4 and firms
set their basic varieties at both ends of the market, if consumers are not less efficient than firms
in  transportation we find an extreme personal  arbitrage  behavior: in a subgame perfect
equilibrium, all consumers decide to demand the same variety at the center of the market, even
though their preferences may differ. The demanded variety is such that competition between
firms is intense and the equilibrium delivered price for that variety is the lowest.
5 To obtain this
result we do not need any kind of explicit or implicit coordination on the part of consumers;
each consumer finds it optimal to demand the same variety, possibly different from his/her most
preferred  variety of the product.
6  The  reason is just that his/her favorite variety is more
                                    
3 Other papers giving active roles to consumers are Fujita and Thisse (1986) and García, Georgantzís and Orts
(1996). In these papers consumers decide their location in the market.
4 Models of product differentiation involving a quadratic utility loss function include Novshek and Sonnenschein
(1979), Eaton and Wooders (1985),  Neven  (1985),  Economides  (1989)  and  Friedman  and  Thisse (1993). See
Anderson et al. (1992), chapter 4, for a more general discussion of this assumption. On the other hand, many
ideal-point models used in the literature of marketing assume that preferences are negatively related to the squared
(weighted) distance between location and the individual’s ideal point  (see,  for example, Green  and  Srinivasan,
1978).  
5 Recent work has shown that the key for the principle of Minimum Differentiation to hold is the moderation of
price competition. Competition may be relaxed by introducing product differentiation in some other dimension
(see, for example, De Palma et al., 1985), by considering  unobservable  attributes in consumer brand choice
(Rhee et al., 1992), by fixing market price  exogenously, by assuming competition in quantities rather than
prices  (Anderson  and  Neven,  1991), by allowing price  matching policies (Zhang, 1995) or by considering
collusion on price (Friedman and Thisse, 1993). Our result would provide an explanation of the principle of
Minimum Differentiation based on consumer behavior.
6 The possibility of arbitrage is also present in Eaton and Schmitt (1994). In that paper  consumers  and  firms
have different transportation costs and consumers are free to buy the product at any point in the space; consumers
do not buy their ideal product if the price reduction on a different variety is more than the utility loss from not
getting the preferred product.-4-
expensive, since competition on that particular variety is weaker than on the standard variety; and
the price difference is higher than the incurred utility loss.
More generally, when the locations of the firms are not fixed (in terms of product differentiation,
they choose where to set the basic variety), we show that consumers tend to agglomerate around
the center of the market and, therefore, the demand distribution is more concentrated than the
distribution of preferences.
7 The equilibrium firms locations are inefficient because they do not
minimize the social transportation cost. From a social point of view, it would be optimal for
consumers and firms to share transportation costs; in other words for consumers to practise
efficient arbitrage, but arbitrage behavior depends on firms’ pricing policies and in equilibrium
its level will not be optimal. Furthermore, even if locations were fixed at the efficient levels, in
equilibrium there would be a welfare loss due to inefficient arbitrage associated with equilibrium
pricing policies.
In  this paper the  shape of transportation  costs plays an important role. In a product
differentiation framework, the concavity or convexity of transport costs can be related to the
shape of the customizing-cost curve.
8 In this case transportation cost is usually viewed as a
convex function of distance (Thisse and Vives, 1988). In the geographical context, it is usually
assumed that, due to economies of scale in transportation, transportation costs are concave (see,
for example, Hoover, 1937, and Thisse and Vives,  1988), but for the  sake of computational
simplicity the standard assumption in the literature of spatial competition is that transportation
costs are linear. However, some factors may penalize long-distance freight; for instance, there
may be congestion along the transport route (for example, transportation downtown).
9 Taking
                                    
7 We obtain similar results under linear-quadratic transport cost (see Gabszewicz and  Thisse, 1986) or under a
more general family of convex transportation costs given by t(d) = tdα, where d denotes distance and 1 < α  ≤ 2
(see Economides, 1986 and  Anderson  et al., 1992, chapter  6). In Appendix 1, we generalize our results by
allowing any convex transportation cost function.
8 See the interpretation of spatial price discrimination in terms of product differentiation in Greenhut et al.
(1987), MacLeod et al. (1988), Thisse and Vives (1988) or Aguirre et al. (1998).
9 See Greenhut et al., 1987, p. 276, for other justifications of convex transportation costs. On the other hand,
in some models of product differentiation freight costs are paid in terms of the good as “iceberg transport costs”
(see, Samuelson 1954, and Martinez-Giralt and Usategui, 1997):  the inverse of the rate at which the good loses-5-
into account these features, many works in the literature of spatial price competition assume
convex (in particular, quadratic) transportation costs.
Under  asymmetric transportation  costs for consumers and firms, personal arbitrage is an
equilibrium phenomenon whenever consumers are more efficient than firms in short-distance
transportation. Nevertheless, it is under convex transportation technologies that the possibility of
arbitrage becomes most relevant, not only because equilibrium pricing policies involve arbitrage
by consumers, but also because it is optimal, even from a social welfare point of view, for there
to be arbitrage.
Even in a geographical interpretation, transport cost may be different for firms and consumers.
Consumers may transport goods themselves as a non-market activity so that the cost (in terms of
time, wear and tear, gasoline, etc.) coincides neither with the equilibrium price in the market for
transport services nor with the transport cost for the firm (for instance, a worker’s time cost
includes taxes while consumers’ time spent in non-market activities is not taxed; the transport of
products by the firm may also require insurance against freight damage). With respect to this
point, Lewis (1945) states:
“We  must also note precisely what transport cost means in this context. MTC
(marginal transport cost) is a measure of all the inconvenience associated with
buying at a distant shop. It is not the same as what it would cost the shop in
money to deliver one’s purchases. A customer who shops in the centre of the
town may be quite capable of carrying home a pair of shoes without much
extra trouble or inconvenience, and if asked to pay an extra sum equal to what
delivery would cost the shop, might prefer to carry for himself” (p. 208-209).
The  consequences of arbitrage have  been largely ignored in the literature on spatial price
discrimination. Usually, optimal pricing policies  satisfy a restriction to prevent  arbitrage by
consumers or arbitrage is simply assumed away.
10 However, as Machlup (1949), Scherer (1970,
                                                                                                     
its value when distance increases is an index for the transport cost and this index is considered a convex function
of distance.
10 An exception is a recent paper dealing with arbitrage and convex transportation costs by Barros and Martínez-
Giralt (1996), who study the implications for the location of firms of convex transportation costs and arbitrage
under FOB pricing;  in their paper arbitrage is allowed only for firms and to a limited extent.-6-
p. 270-271) and Phlips (1983, p. 28) illustrate personal arbitrage may be a real economic
phenomenon, for example, under the basing-point system. That arbitrage was a concern in the
US steel industry until 1924 can be confirmed, for instance, in Machlup (1949) (“The Basing-
point System”, p. 139-142) which dedicates a few pages to the problem of “diversion of
shipments” in this industry and also in the cement industry. Here are some excerpts:
 11
“Even if sellers under the basing-point system refuse to quote prices f.o.b.
place of shipment and insist on quoting delivered prices, buyers may get wise to
the fact that producers are willing to absorb large amounts of freight on
shipments to distant destinations. A smart buyer might try to buy in the guise of
a distant customer and divert the shipment to a destination much closer to the
producing mill”.
“The buyer can divert shipments from one destination to another most easily if
he picks up the products at the mill in his own truck. Let us assume that a steel
consumer has two establishments, one close to and the other distant from a steel
mill. Either the latter consuming point or both are governed by a basing-point
away from that mill. Knowing that the mill will  absorb  all or a part of the
freight to the distant consuming point, he might order the steel needed for both
his establishments as if he wanted it all in the distant place”.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. In Section 3, we solve the game
to obtain the subgame perfect equilibria and present the main results. The equilibrium price
schedule is such that the demanded varieties tend to agglomerate around the center of the market.
We show that personal  arbitrage is an equilibrium phenomenon  whenever  consumers  have
convex transportation costs or are more efficient than firms in short-distance transportation.
Section 4 briefly analyzes welfare and policy implications. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2. The model  
We consider a model with a continuum of consumers and two firms denoted by A and B. The
two firms produce a homogeneous product but may have different locations on [0,1]. Buyers are
uniformly distributed with a unit density on the interval [0,1]. The location of a consumer is
denoted by x and defined as the distance to the left point of the market. We will refer to x as the
                                    
11 In a pure location context, convex transportation costs may not be convincing in many circumstances. Under
linear or concave transport cost, our model would account for these arbitrage phenomena as long as consumers
were more efficient than firms on short distance transportation.-7-
type of consumer located at x. Firms know the distribution of consumer types, but are unable to
identify the type of an individual buyer: x is private information of each buyer. Consumer x may
order delivery of the product to a location  ˆ x, possibly different from x. The reservation value for
the good, R, is the same for all consumers and each one purchases precisely one unit of the
product from the firm providing the lowest final (delivered) price including the transport cost
incurred by the consumer. When the two firms have the same delivered price at a given location,
the consumer chooses the supplier with the lower transportation cost.
12
The location of firm A is denoted by a, the distance from the firm to the left point of the market,
and the location of firm B is b, the distance from the firm to the right endpoint of the market.
With no loss of generality we assume a  ≤ 1 - b. Marginal costs are constant and identical for
both firms; for the sake of notational simplicity prices are expressed net of marginal cost. We
assume that firms sell at a constant unit price at a given location, although they may spatially
price discriminate: firms use delivered pricing policies.
We consider asymmetric transportation costs for consumers and firms: tf(d) is the transportation
cost for firms and tc(d) the transportation cost for consumers, where d is the Euclidean distance
between two locations in the market.
13 Transportation costs are strictly increasing functions of
distance, tf’(d) >  0 and tc’(d) >  0. Some of the main results of the paper are obtained by
assuming quadratic transportation costs: tf(d) = tfd2 and tc(d) = tcd2.
14 We assume consumers
have a reservation value high enough for one firm to find it profitable to serve the whole market:
R > tf(1).
The timing of the game is as follows. At stage 1, firms choose their locations in the market
simultaneously and independently. At stage 2, the two firms decide on the price level  for each
                                    
12 The assumption that price ties are broken in the socially efficient way is fairly standard in the literature. See,
for example, Lederer and Hurter (1986) for a justification.
13 See Gronberg and Meyer (1981) for a model with different transportation cost for consumers and firms.
14 In Appendix 1 we allow more general transportation technologies for firms and consumers and we show that
our main results do not depend on this assumption.-8-
possible  variety  and consumers decide which variety to demand, simultaneously and
independently.
15  Denote by  ˆ x  the  variety  demanded by consumer  located at x.  Then, if
consumer x finally buys the good, the supplier will deliver it at location  ˆ x. Finally, firms’ price
schedules and demanded varieties are observed and consumers buy the product from the
supplier offering the lowest price at the requested location.
Since firms and consumers decide price schedule and product variety simultaneously, neither
has any ability to precommit. This description fits well in markets where goods are produced to
order and the consumer has to specify the design of the product. This is the case for instance of
custom-made (clothing, etc.) or custom-built (houses, etc.) products; other examples include the
acquisition of software, furniture and so on.
  16  Our  model  predicts that in this context, if
transportation costs are convex buyers will not demand their preferred product design, but will
rather tend to ask for more standard varieties.
3. Equilibrium analysis  
We  now solve the sequential  game by backward induction to obtain the subgame perfect
equilibria.
3. 1. Second stage: optimal pricing policies and consumers’ behavior
Equilibrium pricing policies
We obtain the optimal price schedule (the best response) for any set of requested varieties or
announced locations. Let  ˆ X = { ˆ x ∈ [0,1]} be a set of announced locations. Let pA( ˆ x) and
pB( ˆ x) be the delivered prices at location  ˆ x ∈  ˆ X. The delivered price at  ˆ x  must  cover the
transportation cost.
17 Define xAB  as the location such that tf(|a - xAB|) = tf(|(1 - b) - xAB|), i.e. the
                                    
15 We could allow consumers to announce different types to the two firms, but consumers have nothing to gain
by doing this, so we ignore the possibility.
16 This description of market behavior fits also many industrial procurement procedures. In fact, the model can
be interpreted as a model for a non-final (intermediate) product, so that consumers are firms and the product is
used as input in the production of a final good.
17 We assume that firms do not price  below cost. If a firm were to price  below transport cost at a given-9-
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At a given location  ˆ x ∈  ˆ X, competition is à la Bertrand: with cost asymmetries if  ˆ x ≠ xAB  and
with the same cost if  ˆ x = xAB. When  ˆ x < xAB, firm A’s transportation cost is lower than firm
B’s. The opposite is true when  ˆ x > xAB. This implies that in equilibrium the delivered price at  ˆ x
will equal the transportation cost of the firm located further from  ˆ x.
Given the previous argument, when firms A and B  are located at a  and  b,  respectively, the
equilibrium pricing policies are given by:
18
               pA( ˆ x) = pB( ˆ x) = max { tf (|a -  ˆ x|), tf (|(1 - b) -  ˆ x|)}   for all  ˆ x ∈  ˆ X  (2)
When  ˆ X does not coincide with [0, 1], there are varieties which are not demanded by any
consumer. At those locations any price quote is a best response since no sales will be made at
that price. However, we impose the restriction that firms choose for each location a price that
would be optimal if a consumer decided to demand that variety. This restriction selects a unique
equilibrium for the game. Note that if firms could perfectly discriminate among consumers’
locations, (2) would be also the equilibrium price schedule with  ˆ x = x. Denote by  ˆ Xf(f = A, B)
the set of announced locations for which either firm f (f = A, B) quotes the lowest delivered price
or, if both firms quote the same price, firm f is not the high transportation cost firm. Note that
ˆ Xf is a subset of  ˆ X . Denote by  ˆ F the cumulative distribution function of announced locations.
Profits for the two firms are:
                                                                                                     
location, it could do at least as well by pricing at transport cost for any given price of the other firm. This is a
usual assumption in the literature of spatial price discrimination. See, for example, Lederer and Hurter (1986),
Thisse and Vives (1988), DeFraja and Norman (1993) and Aguirre and Martín (2001).
18 See Lederer and Hurter (1986) for a formal proof.-10-
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Consumers’ optimal behavior
The surplus of consumer x when he/she announces  ˆ x and buys from firm f (f = A, B) is given
by:
Sx( ˆ x) = R - pf( ˆ x) - tc(| ˆ x -  x |)  (5)
Given firms’ locations and pricing policies, consumer x chooses  ˆ x so as to maximize his/her
surplus. To maximize surplus, the requested variety  ˆ x (by consumer x) minimizes the sum of
delivered  price at the announced  location  plus  the transportation  cost to the true location.
Consumer x requests his/her preferred variety,  ˆ x  = x, when:
pf(x) ≤ pf( ˆ x) + tc(| ˆ x -  x |),   ∀  ˆ x ≠ x  (6)
i.e., given firms’  pricing policies in equilibrium, (2), when:
 
  max { tf (|a - x |), tf (|(1 - b) - x |)} -  max { tf (|a -  ˆ x|),  tf (|(1 - b) -  ˆ x|)} ≤ tc(| ˆ x -  x |) (7)
Suppose that consumer x ∈ [0, xAB], is considering whether to be served at location x or  ˆ x;
consumer x does not have any incentive to demand a less preferred variety:
tf (|(1 - b) - x |) - tf (|(1 - b) -  ˆ x|) ≤ tc(| ˆ x -  x |)            for any   ˆ x ∈ ˆ XA   (8)
and-11-
tf (|(1 - b) - x |) - tf (|a -  ˆ x|) ≤ tc(| ˆ x -  x |)                    for any   ˆ x ∈  ˆ XB  (9)
                               (Insert Figure 1)
When transportation costs are convex, consumer x is better off buying the good at some location
other than his/her own. Figure 1 shows the incentives to arbitrage under convex transportation
costs. In this case, there are locations at which the difference in expected delivered prices makes
up for the utility loss from not consuming the most preferred variety of the product. Under
convex transportation costs, given firms’ locations and anticipated pricing policies, consumer x
demands the product at a location  ˆ* x  such that his surplus, (5), is maximized:
ˆ* x  = argmin
ˆ x 
 [ max { tf (|a -  ˆ x|),  tf (|(1 - b) -  ˆ x|)} + tc (| ˆ x - x |)] (10)
                      
where  x  is  the true location. Notice that if x  ∈ [0, x AB]  then  ˆ x  ∈ [0, x AB],  since  xAB =
argmin[max{tf (|a -  ˆ x|),  tf (|(1 - b) -  ˆ x|)}]. Thus, the problem for a consumer x ∈ [0, xAB] is:
min
ˆ x 
tf (|(1 - b) -  ˆ x|) + tc (| ˆ x -  x |)
From the first order condition:
19
  t f ’(|(1 - b) -  ˆ x|) =  tc ’(| ˆ x - x |) (11)
                         
Under quadratic transportation costs, condition (11) implies that tf [(1 - b) -  ˆ x] = tc( ˆ x - x) and
therefore:
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19 Second order conditions are satisfied since the transportation cost functions are convex.-12-
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Next, consider consumers located at x ∈ [xAB, 1]. Using a similar reasoning it is easy to check
that:
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We refer to this result as personal arbitrage because all consumers demand the product at a
location different from the real one and incur transportation costs, even though the system used
is delivered pricing. Note that personal arbitrage would be absent in equilibrium only when
tc →∞.
The following proposition summarizes the above results:-13-
Proposition 1:  Given firms’ locations, a and b:
(i) In equilibrium firms price according to:
pA( ˆ x) = pB( ˆ x) = max { tf(|a -  ˆ x|), tf(|(1 - b) -  ˆ x|)}   for all  ˆ x ∈  ˆ X
(ii) Under quadratic transportation costs, the distribution of consumers’ locations  and the
distribution of demanded varieties differ. The cumulative distribution function of consumers’
locations is F(x) = x , for x ∈ [0, 1], while the cumulative distribution function of demanded
varieties is   
ˆ (ˆ )
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(14)
We have  shown that under  quadratic  transportation  costs  there is a difference between the
distribution of consumer locations and the distribution of demanded varieties. Consumers do not
demand their preferred product variety: they practice personal arbitrage and, as a consequence,
there is concentration of demand on varieties located around the central place between the two
firms. Consumers’ preferences are  uniformly distributed with unit density along [0, 1].
However, from (12) and (13), the distribution of demanded varieties  ˆ* x  has two parts: they are
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. The smaller a, b and tc the higher the concentration
of demand around the center of the market. In the extreme case, when tc  ≤ tf and firms are
located at the endpoints of the market, a = b = 0, all consumers demand the same variety  ˆ x = xAB
for all x, for which the delivered price is lowest. In this case, all consumers buy the product at xAB
and the result of minimal product diversity (from the point of view of consumer demand) holds:
only one variety is sold in the market. See Figure 2.
                               
(Insert Figure 2)-14-
Personal arbitrage arises under quadratic transportation costs, and it causes partial agglomeration
of consumers demand on the frontier between the two firms’ market areas. Since market areas
are determined by the locations chosen by firms, we need to solve the first stage of the game to
take firms’ incentives into consideration.  
3.2. First stage: location decisions
In the first stage firms decide their locations by taking into account the effect on pricing policies,
transportation costs and the behavior of consumers. The results are presented as Proposition 2.











Proof: Note that firms obtain zero profit from sales to consumers buying at xAB.  At  such
location, transportation costs are equal for both firms and, hence, the equilibrium price is equal to
the common marginal cost. Therefore, at xAB profits are zero regardless of any sharing rule we
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where  ˆ* x , ˆ (ˆ ) ** Fx  and xAB  are given by (12), (14) and (1), respectively.  We can use (12) to write
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Q.E.D.
Note that when arbitrage is taken into consideration, in equilibrium firms locate closer to each
other than in the standard case of spatial price discrimination where firms locate at the quartiles
(see, for example, Lederer and Hurter, 1986). When tf   = tc, then ab ** ==
2
5
; firms locate closer
to the center if  tf  > tc: ab ** =>
2
5
, and further from the center if tf  < tc:  ab ** =<
2
5
. This is an
unexpected result and shows  the importance that consumers’  arbitrage  behavior (usually
ignored) may have under convex transportation technologies. Not only do firms locate closer to
the center with convex costs, but consumers also concentrate their demands around the center of
the market. Figure 3 shows the equilibrium demand distribution function.
                                   (Insert Figure 3)
4. Welfare and policy implications   
In this section we analyze the welfare effects of personal arbitrage. We will see that this behavior
creates inefficiencies in terms of excessive transportation costs. We evaluate welfare effects from
two points of view: in subsetion 4.1, we analyze efficient arbitrage by consumers and firms’
optimal locations from a first best perspective; in subsection  4.2, we study the second best
optimal locations for firms.-16-
4.1. Efficient arbitrage  and first best locations   
First, we show that the first best locations under convex transportation costs are the same as with
concave or linear transportation technologies, and this is so even when we consider the efficient
level of personal arbitrage.
Denote by  ˆ xe
 the efficient location, defined as the location where consumer x should be served
in order to minimize the total transportation cost. For x ∈ [ 0, xAB],  ˆ xe is the solution to:
min
ˆ x 
 { tf(|a -  ˆ x|) + tc(| ˆ x - x |)}
Note that if x ∈ [0, xAB] then  ˆ xe ∈ [0, xAB] since tf(|a - xAB|) = tf(|(1 - b) - xAB|). From the first
order condition:
tf    ’(|a  -  ˆ xe|) = tc ’(| ˆ xe - x |) (18)
Hence, under quadratic transportation costs, it must be the case that tf(a -  ˆ xe) = tc( ˆ xe - x) and
then:








              for  x ∈ [0, xAB]  (19)
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a should buy at a, and consumers at xAB should buy the product at 
























          for  x ∈ [xAB, 1] (20)
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The next proposition states the first best locations for firms given efficient personal arbitrage by
consumers.




Proof: See Appendix 2A.
With convex transportation costs, in the social welfare optimum consumers would not get their
favorite product but something between that and the variety that the firm is best fitted to produce.
The efficient locations are ab ee ==
1
4
. Note that equilibrium locations are efficient only in the
limit: lim a
tc





 and  lim a
t f







              (Insert Figure 4)
Figure 4 shows the efficient demand distribution function. Note that efficient arbitrage requires
that consumers at locations x ∈ [0, 1
2







firm A’s location and consumers at locations x ∈ [1
2






) around firm B’s location. Comparing Figures 3 and 4 we can see that in equilibrium the
demand distribution is too concentrated compared to the efficient distribution. In other words,
even though there is some arbitrage in the first best, in equilibrium there is inefficient arbitrage.
Efficiency  requires  consumers and firms to share transportation costs optimally.  From
Propositions 2 and 3, in equilibrium firms set their basic variety inefficiently close to each other.
This is not, however, the only source of inefficiency, as the following Corollary points out.-18-
Corollary 1:  Under convex transportation costs even if firms had fixed locations at the first
best,  ab ee ==
1
4
, in equilibrium there would be a welfare loss due to inefficient arbitrage.
From a product differentiation point of view it is interesting to compare equilibrium product
diversity with the efficient level. If we consider the length of the support of the  cumulative
distribution function as a measure of product diversity (for instance, if the demand distribution
function had a support [0,1] then 100% of product varieties would be demanded), we have
Corollary 2: Equilibrium product diversity is lower than the efficient level.
From a social welfare point of view,  the efficient level of product  diversity  depends on the
comparison  between transportation  costs for consumers and firms. In particular, the more
efficient consumers are in transportation the lower the efficient level of product diversity is. At
the limit, when tc → 0 efficiency requires only two varieties, a and b. Only when tc → ∞ would
maximal product diversity be optimal. However, the market outcome implies too low product
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 per cent of the potential product varieties will be











We  have  shown  that the welfare effects are unambiguously  negative.  First,  firms  locate
inefficiently close to each other and, secondly, even if locations are fixed at the efficient levels
equilibrium pricing policies give  rise to inefficient arbitrage and transportation costs  are not
minimized. The welfare loss  associated with inefficient arbitrage is due to excessive
transportation costs. In terms of product differentiation, firms that could produce specialized
products sell standard varieties to consumers who would like more specialized products. From a
social point of view, it is optimal for consumers and firms to share transportation costs. In other
words, it is necessary for consumers to practice efficient arbitrage, but arbitrage behavior
depends on firms’ pricing policies and it will not be optimal. To induce consumers towards
efficient arbitrage each firm should price at its own transportation cost: p(x) = min{ tf (|a - x |), tf
(|(1 - b) - x |)}.-19-
4.2. Second best locations
We obtain second best locations for firms by minimizing the total transportation cost given
equilibrium pricing policies and condition (14), the equilibrium distribution function of
consumer demand.
Proposition 4: Second best locations are
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Proof: See Appendix 2B.
(Insert Figure 5)
It is easy to check that  ˜ ˜ ** aba b => =. Only at the limit, equilibrium locations are equal to the
second-best locations:  lim a lim a
tt cc






˜ and  lim a lim a
tt ff





˜. Figure 5 shows the second
best  demand distribution function (the dotted line),  ˜(˜) Fx(that  is, the equilibrium demand
distribution function, condition (14), evaluated at the second best locations). Comparing  ˜(˜) Fx
and Fx ** (ˆ ) (the distribution function (14) evaluated at the equilibrium locations) we can see that
in equilibrium the demand distribution is too concentrated compared to the (second best)





˜ ˜) in equilibrium
20% of consumers buy the product at the center of the market while in the second best outcome
this percentage drops to 10.5%.
5. Concluding remarks  
We have shown that under convex transportation costs, consumers may find it in their interest to
demand not their most preferred varieties but more standard varieties. As a consequence of this
personal arbitrage behavior, product diversity decreases, giving rise to a demand distribution that
is not only more concentrated than the distribution of preferences but also more concentrated
than the efficient distribution.-20-
Our results could be generalized in several directions. The assumption of inelastic demand could
be relaxed without altering the result of the tendency to agglomeration under  convex
transportation costs. The timing of the game could be changed. Timing reflects commitment and
it is difficult to judge who has more commitment power, the firm setting prices or the consumers
announcing location, so that in our model those decisions are simultaneous. If consumers took
their decision before firms, the outcome of the game would be the same, but if we allowed firms
to move  first and make price offers conditioned on announced location, formally this would
amount to a revelation game where consumers  declare their type. If firms could commit
themselves to the price schedule, then in general the optimal policy is not to price at the rival’s
marginal cost at each location in the local market, since the firm could do better by inducing
consumers to demand varieties closer to the base variety. Thus, the game would be one of
preference revelation with competition between firms. Unfortunately, a location-price equilibrium
for that duopoly model is not easy to characterize and the question is left for further research.
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Appendix 1
Convex and nonconvex transportation technologies
In this Appendix we show that  our results do not depend on the  assumption of quadratic
transportation costs for consumers and firms,  and  some of them not even on convex
transportation  costs. The first observation is that personal  arbitrage is an equilibrium
phenomenon whenever consumers’ transportation costs are such that tc’(0) = 0, and  firms’
transportation technology such that tf’(d) > 0 for d > 0 and tf’(0) ≥ 0 for d = 0. To see why this
is so, consider the optimization problem for a consumer at x ∈ [0, xAB]:
         min
ˆ x 
 p( ˆ x) + tc(| ˆ x -  x |)
In equilibrium p( ˆ x) = tf(|(1 - b) -  ˆ x|) for  ˆ x ∈ [0, xAB]. The first order condition is:
tf’(|(1 - b) -  ˆ* x |) - tc’(| ˆ* x  -  x |) = 0  (A1)
Assume that tf and tc are such that the objective function is convex and (A1) characterizes the
solution for the consumer. If  ˆ* x  = x then tc’(| ˆ* x  - x |) = 0 since by assumption tc’(0) = 0 which
implies tf’(|(1 - b) -  ˆ* x |) = 0 but that is not possible when tf’(d) > 0 for any d > 0.
We  conclude  this Appendix by showing that  personal  arbitrage  may be an equilibrium
phenomenon with nonconvex transportation technologies. Consider asymmetric transportation
costs, linear in distance, for consumers and firms: tfd is the transportation cost for firms and the















               
                 
.  Obviously, if
consumers are more efficient in transportation than firms, tc < tf and  ˜ d = 1, all consumers will
engage in an extreme arbitrage behavior by purchasing at the center of the market. However, for
personal arbitrage to arise in equilibrium it is sufficient that consumers be slightly more efficient
than firms in very short-distance travels (i.e. tc < tf and any  ˜ d > 0 no matter how small).
20
                                    
20 Similar results are obtained if firms have concave transportation costs and consumers are more efficient in
short hauls.-22-
Appendix 2
A. First best locations
Given the efficient demand distribution function, the total transportation cost is:
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From (19) and (20), we can express the total transportation cost in terms of true consumer
locations:



































































































It is easy to check,  from  the  first order conditions of the  transportation  cost  minimization
problem,  that: ab b e() ( ) = −
1
3
1  and ba a e() ( ) = −
1
3
1.   Therefore, the first best locations





The  second best optimal  locations  for firms will be obtained  by  minimizing the total
transportation cost given condition (14), the (equilibrium) cumulative distribution function of
announced location. In equilibrium, consumer x demands the variety  ˆ* x (see conditions (12) and
(13)) given by-23-
ˆ
(1 -   )
,
() ( ) ()
() ( ) ()
,




at t b t t
t
xx
at t b t t
t





























                              for 













































                                      for 





Given equilibrium pricing policies and the associated inefficient arbitrage by consumers, the total
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(A4)
From the first order conditions of the transportation cost minimization problem we obtain that
the second-best locations are
˜ ˜ () () () ()
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of Industrial Economics XLIII, 287-299.Figure 1. Personal arbitrage and the tendency for consumers to
demand at locations closer to the center of the market.
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px t x x c (ˆ)( | ˆ |) + −Figure 2. Distribution function for demanded varieties,  ˆ(ˆ) Fx.
Minimal product diversity with locations fixed at a = b = 0, and
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*Figure 4. Efficient demand distribution function. F(x): distribution


















































f c 4( ) +Figure 5. Second-best  demand distribution function. F(x): distribution
function of preferences. Fx ** (ˆ ):  equilibrium demand distribution
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